The Pitfalls of Collective Bargaining: Part I

 

          The current cycle of major union contract negotiations has come to an end. For both the Teamsters and the United Auto Workers (UAW), this has been a critical year, a time when these unions would confront some of the largest and most profitable corporations in the world. UPS generated $74 billion dollars in profit in 2022, while General Motors profits were $21 billion dollars during the same year. The new, reform leadership of both unions pledged to organize militant struggles that would bring significant victories in wages and working conditions for their members. In their rhetoric, Teamsters President Sean O’Brien and UAW President Shawn Fain strongly suggested strikes would be used to extract the best deal possible for their members.

In the end, little actual pressure on the capitalists happened. The Teamster contract with the United Parcel Service (UPS), covering 340,000 workers, was settled without a strike, while the UAW agreement with the three large unionized auto corporations, covering 150,000 workers, was negotiated after a few weeks of token strikes.

          The resulting contracts included some partial gains, but, overall, both sets of contracts fell far short of what had been promised. The Teamsters contract was approved by a large majority in a ratification vote, but union members nearly defeated the tentative contract at General Motors.

          Groups like Teamsters Mobilize formed in opposition to their belief the Teamsters failed to live up to the radical promise presented this past summer. As rank and file workers mobilize to demand a more militant union, what are the lessons to be learned from this round of negotiations?  Instead of going through each contract on a point-by-point basis, this article will seek to distill broader lessons to be learned from this most recent discouraging debacle. The focus will be  looking at typical pitfalls that occur during the collective bargaining process, in the hope that they can be made  to avoid themed in the future.

The Necessity for Militant Action

It was widely understood that both the UAW and the Teamsters had suffered from inept and corrupt leaders who had given away major concessions in previous contracts. Forcing the corporations to cancel these concessions would require a show of solidarity by union members. Yet little was done to prepare for a lengthy strike and contract negotiations proceeded smoothly with little sign of militant resistance.

          Once the contract was negotiated, Teamster leaders insisted that the mere threat of a prolonged strike had been sufficient to extract significant concessions from UPS. This claim is empty bluster. Powerful corporations are not impressed by union threats. The only way to effectively counter corporate power is to shut down production for a lengthy period of time. Threats of militant action will be perceived as a bluff until the union can demonstrate that its members are united and willing to confront management.

          A sizable strike fund makes it more possible to conduct a long strike. Such a fund cannot provide a total solution, but it can help. The UAW leadership turned this argument around by claiming that a full-scale strike at one of the large auto corporations would deplete the strike fund. This is upside down. Unions create strike funds so that they can conduct lengthy strikes.

The Need for Short-Term Contracts

Both the Teamsters and the UAW failed to organize militant strikes, so the contracts that were negotiated included a myriad of dubious provisions. To start, both contracts are for a time period that is far too long. The negotiation of a new contract is a crucial time when rank and file members can become actively involved in determining the union’s policies. Longer contracts allow union officials to entrench themselves in power as those on the shop floor become passive bystanders. The Teamsters contract will last for five years, while the UAW contract will extend for four and a half years. Both terminate in 2028. Just on this basis, both contracts should have been rejected. There is no valid reason for a union contract to last more than two years.

Wage Increases Versus Inflation

The need for contracts covering a short period of time becomes even more important in a period of rapid inflation. Predicting the rate of inflation for several years in the future is virtually impossible. Wars, breaks in the supply chain and the increasing volatility of global climate patterns can all trigger a spike in inflation.

          A modest estimate of the inflation rate for the next five years would set it at five per cent (5%). The Teamster contract calls for an increase in the basic wage for full-time workers of 19% over the life of the contract. This would mean an increase of less than 4% per year. The chief financial officer of UPS estimated the total cost of the contract, wages and benefits, at 3.3% per year. These figures mean that union members will be receiving less in 2028 in total compensation, allowing for inflation, than they receive now.

          The wage increases included in the UAW contract are marginally better. Full-time production workers will receive an increase of about 30% over the term of the contract, or an increase of about 6% per year. This includes expected increases due to a clause that provides partial protection against inflation.

     Thus, the UAW contract will at least cover inflation, but not much more. Since 2008, when the union agreed to a contract filled with concessions, there has been a drop in real wages for union members of 19%. Just to get back to where its members were before, the UAW needed to negotiate a contract that would include pay increases substantially higher than the rate of inflation. The 2023 contract failed to do this.

Mollifying Skilled Workers

The current UAW leadership likes to congratulate itself as progressives pledged to a more just and equal society. Nevertheless, the current contract includes a provision that will significantly increase income disparities among full-time workers.

          Skilled workers are an important segment of the auto industry workforce. Their votes are counted separately, although the final tally includes all union members. The UAW leadership knew that there would be significant opposition to the proposed contract among those working on the line, so they went out of their way to pacify the skilled trades.

    In the first year of the contract, skilled workers will receive an additional $1.50 an hour, beyond the wage increases going to production workers. The special increase is termed a tool allowance. Over a year, this comes to $3000, a lot of tools.

          This is a substantial increase, particularly since it is included for each year of the contract. Prior to the start of this contract, skilled workers received about $4.90 an hour more than full-time production workers. By 2028, this gap in pay will have increased to nearly $8.00 per hour. Over the life of the contract, the gap in pay between production workers and skilled workers will have increased by 65%. Instead of an egalitarian approach to wage rates, the UAW leadership opted for a strategy that increased wage differentials between skilled workers and those on the line.

     The ploy worked. In General Motors, production workers in seven of the eleven large assembly plants rejected the proposed contract, but skilled workers overwhelmingly supported it by a margin of nearly two to one. In the end, the contract was narrowly approved, with 45% of UAW members at GM rejecting the contract. The leadership depended on the votes of skilled workers to carry a contract that held little appeal for many production workers.

          This first section of the article looked at some of the broader issues raised by the UAW and Teamster contracts. The next section will look at specific points in the contracts.


Pitfalls in Collective Bargaining: Part 2

 

          The first section of this article examined the broader issues raised by the recent Teamster and UAW contracts. Specifically, it looked at the length of the contracts and the wage increases granted to full-time workers. This second section will focus on some of the  specific points in these contracts. As in the previous section, the intent is to recognize the pitfalls embedded in these contracts, in order to avoid these traps in the future.

Front Loading

          Union leaders understood that the failure to substantially increase real wages over the life of the contracts would result in rank and file resistance to approving them. Those negotiating the contracts therefore turned to tricky maneuvers to overcome this resistance. One of these maneuvers was the front loading of wage increases.

          When contracts are designed to last for several years, as both the Teamster and UAW contracts were, increases in the hourly wage rate can be scheduled so that the largest increases occur during the first year. Significantly lower increases are slotted for the following years, often significantly less than the expected inflation rate. The tentative contract can then be sold to the membership on the basis that ratification will lead to an immediate and rapid jump in wages. This is a tempting prospect for those living on the edge of financial disaster. Nevertheless, a few years later, with real wages falling, creditors will again be at the door and the cycle will begin again.

          The UAW contract is a particularly flagrant example of front loading. Over the four and a half years of the contract, basic wages will rise by 25%. In the first year, wages will jump by 11%, before falling to 3% increases during the next three years. A provision in the contract provides a partial protection against inflation, so the total wage increase will come to 30% during the entire term of the contract. Of that, about 40% of the increase will come during the first year.

          The Teamster contract with UPS is also front loaded. The basic wage rate will increase by $7.50 over the five years of the contract. Of this, $2.75 will come during the first year and an increase of only $4.75 an hour over the next four years, or about $1.20 on average each year. This means that UPS workers will get about 37% of their wage increase in the basic rate during the first year. Front loading is even worse when the entire package is taken into account. The chief financial officer of UPS has estimated that 46%, or nearly half, of the increase in total compensation, wages plus benefits, would be received during the first year of the contract. In a five year contract, this is front loading with a vengeance.

          There is no legitimate reason for front loading a collective bargaining contract. Indeed, there is no reason for a lengthy contract in the first place. At least, when a lengthy contract is negotiated, wage and benefit increases should occur at a steady rate over the entire period covered. Front loading is designed to confuse union members and to convince them to accept an inadequate contract on the basis of an immediate, but short-lived, gain.

Bonus Payments

          Another manipulative maneuver used to ensure ratification was the provision of a pay increase through a bonus payment. The UAW contract offered a $5000 bonus to full-time workers upon ratification. This is again tempting those in financial distress with an immediate but illusory solution to their problem.

          Bonus payments are a one time event. Although the sum may seem a large amount, calculated over the entire length of the contract the amount is small. Furthermore, the bonus is not integrated into the basic wage rate. Thus, when the next contract is negotiated, the existing wage rate does not include the bonus payment. The starting point for the next contract is therefore likely to be a real wage, allowing for inflation, that is even lower than the one at the start of the current contract. Bonus payments are designed to confuse members. They should never be included in a contract.

The Tier System

          Another set of problems involves the creation of artificial divisions, or tiers, within the workforce. The tier system is not only unjust, it is divisive.

          The concessionary contracts negotiated by the previous administrations in both the UAW and the Teamsters were particularly harmful in that they created a tier system of pay categories. Union members doing exactly the same work, even those hired on a full-time basis, were being paid substantially different wages. These artificial divisions undermined solidarity within the union. The introduction of tiers was done deliberately by management with exactly this intent.

          The UAW signed concessionary contracts for several decades prior to this last round of negotiations. In one of these previous contracts the UAW agreed to a special wage scale for new hires. Initially, a newly hired full-time production worker would receive a wage rate that was barely more than half the standard wage rate for production workers. The new hire would then receive small increases in pay for each year on the job. Only after eight years on the job would newly hired workers finally be merged into the regular pay scale and receive the wages due them given their seniority. The second tier for full-time workers remained in place during the contract that expired in 2023.

          This provision in previous contracts proved to be enormously profitable for the auto corporations. The tier system fueled the opposition in the UAW and gave an impetus to the election of a new union leadership. Abolition of tiers was a key demand leading into the negotiations. Nevertheless, the new 2023 contract continues to include a second tier, although the number of years that new hires have to remain on this inferior scale before being moved on to the standard wage scale has been reduced from eight years to three years. Those workers who benefited from this change received a sizable increase and wages and provided much of the support for the new contract.

          This provision of the new contract marks a significant improvement and yet the initial concession should never have been made. A truly militant union would start from a position of rejecting all previous concessions and build from there. Instead, the UAW settled for a limited, partial gain after a series of token strikes.

Part-Time Workers

          In UPS, the primary division created by the contract is the huge gap between full-time and part-time workers. Nearly half the workforce is hired on a part-time basis. Under the previous Teamster contract, the wage rate for part-time workers was so low that many were being paid at the prevailing market rate for entry jobs. Part-time UPS workers were averaging $20 an hour in 2023 across the country, with the wage rate varying considerably by job market. Since the previous contract set the rate at less than $17, this meant that a majority of part-time UPS workers were being paid at the market rate, rather than a wage set through the collective bargaining process. Such a situation can only occur when a union totally fails its members.

          The new, so-called reform Teamster leadership promised that they would fight for a contract that brought major gains to the part-time workers. They failed to do this. The new contract set the new rate for part-timers at $21 per hour. Although this is a substantial increase over the previous contract, it did little to help the majority of part-time workers employed at the prevailing market rate for their community. At the end of this contract, in 2028, the wage rate for part-timers will increase to $25.75. This modest increase might just keep up with inflation over the next five years. The Teamster contract with UPS is likely to leave current part-time employees with the same real wage in five years as they receive now.

          Still, this is not the worst feature of the 2023 contract relating to the part-time workforce. Those hired following the start of the contract will be paid $21 an hour, but this will only increase to $23 by 2028. Part-time workers hired during the life of the contract will actually receive a lower real wage in five years than that received by part-time workers who were hired in 2023.

          In effect, the new contract creates yet another tier of lower paid workers at UPS. There will now be full-time workers, part-time workers hired before the fall of 2023 and a third tier of part-time workers hired after 2023.

          All part-time UPS workers should be placed on the same pay scale, no matter when they were hired. Even more important, the vast gap in pay between part-time and full-time workers should be eliminated. Every UPS worker should receive the same hourly wage rate and the same benefit package per hour, given their seniority, whether they are employed as full-time or part-time workers. The current Teamster leadership promised to end the tier system, but in fact the 2023 agreement creates a new tier of lower pay for part-time workers hired after the start of the contract.

Pensions

          Cuts in pensions are one aspect of a major pitfall that is all too frequently included in collective bargaining agreements. In order to overcome rank and file resistance to inadequate contracts, concessions are included that have a detrimental impact on those who are excluded from the ratification vote. The UAW did this in the past by sharply lowering wages for those hired after the start of the new contract. The current Teamster leadership has followed the same path, but in relation to part-time workers rather than those hired on a full-time basis.

          Retired workers receiving a pension are often the target of the same type of unscrupulous negotiating trick. UPS Teamster members are covered by twelve different pension funds, with specific benefits negotiated for each fund. The Teamster national master contract sets the amount that UPS pays to the relevant fund for each person covered. The contract froze this contribution for a majority of the pension funds for the next five years. These pension funds will remain solvent, so those who are eligible will continue to collect their pensions, and yet the amount they receive will not keep up with the rate of inflation. The 2023 contract will result in a significant decrease in the real value of the pensions received by a majority of Teamster UPS retirees.

          A truly progressive union leadership would make sure that those least able to defend their interests are not negatively impacted by a new contract. The UAW and Teamster leaders failed to meet this basic standard and as a result, pensioners and part-time workers took a hit.

Air Conditioned Vans

          To its credit, the Teamster leadership did make an effort to extend the usual scope of bargaining to meet the challenge set by the climate crisis. Summer heat waves are becoming more frequent and more intense. This has caused critical health problems for UPS drivers sweltering while delivering heavy packages in vans that absorb the sun’s rays. Indeed, several UPS van drivers have died of heat stroke. In July 2022, a driver in the Los Angeles area collapsed during a heat wave and could not be revived.

          UPS management has recognized the problem but has done little to resolve it. The 2023 contract has been touted as a historical breakthrough since UPS has agreed to install air conditioning units in every van purchased after January 1, 2024. Unfortunately, the promise is better than the reality. UPS runs its delivery vans until they collapse. Apparently, it is cheaper to continue to repair a van than to buy a new one, so vans are often in use for more than twelve years. Given this, only one-third of the delivery vans being used by UPS in 2028, the final year of the current contract, will be equipped with air conditioning. By then, the summer heat will be significantly worse and a majority of UPS drivers will be even more stressed than now.

          UPS makes billions of dollars in profit every year. A satisfactory agreement would have required management to have all UPS vans air conditioned by the end of the contract, either by buying new equipment or retrofitting old ones.

          Conclusions

          Triumphalism often characterizes the rhetoric of union officials as they seek to sell their members on a newly negotiated contract. Small gains become historic victories. Incomplete rollbacks of previously granted concessions become momentous breakthroughs. Partial advances improving the health and safety of the workforce become transformed into landmark successes.

          It is not surprising that rank and file Teamster members or auto workers have become cynical about the new batch of supposedly progressive reform leaders. In reviewing the recent contracts, one is struck less by their major faults, although these are important, than by their overall mediocrity. There is no doubt that these are better contracts than those negotiated by Hoffa Junior or the incompetent and corrupt bureaucrats that occupied the UAW’s Solidarity House over the last two decades. Nevertheless, the Teamster and UAW contracts failed to deliver the genuine gains that would have significantly improved the wages, benefits, and working conditions of union members.

          This raises the question: what type of changes need to be made before these unions can become truly militant forces for change?

 

 Transforming Business Unions

 

          The recent fiasco of the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) has raised the broader issue of how a business union can be transformed into a militant, class-conscious organization capable of defending the interests of its members.

          From the start, the TDU project was flawed. In its earliest organizational form, the Teamster opposition caucus was called Teamsters for a Decent Contract. There can be no doubt that the contracts negotiated by Hoffa junior and his predecessors were horrendous. The sole creativity of the old Teamster leadership was the devising of new rationales for contract concessions. Still, their actions were not that different than those taken by the leaders of many other unions.

          The globalization of capital has deliberately shifted the balance of class forces in the industrialized societies. The pragmatic response to this shift was a continuing series of concessions negotiated by union officials. In the Teamsters, the blatant corruption of the union leadership, along with the disastrous contracts, provided a fertile territory for a group of young radicals to leave graduate school and become truck drivers.

          Nevertheless, framing the issue as one of organizing for a better contract was a fundamental strategic error. The only way to create a union that could effectively fight for a decent contract was to first radically alter the structure of the Teamsters. Merely electing a different set of bureaucrats as leaders within the existing union structure can not create a union that will actually challenge corporate power.

The Turn to the Working Class

          In 1970, when the International Socialists (IS) adopted a “turn to the working class”, and sent some of its cadre to the Midwest to become truck drivers, a primary goal was to push the Teamsters Union into breaking with the two-party system. For socialists, independent political action has always been a basic tenet. The working class needs its own political party, so electoral activity should always be totally independent of both mainstream capitalist parties.

          Thus, the irony of seeing the TDU be integrated into a new,  “reform”, leadership that flirts with Trump and the Republican Party. Yet the recent turn of events in the United Auto Workers (UAW), where a reform caucus involving former members of IS has also been integrated into a newly elected leadership, has been only marginally different. The UAW remains embedded within the Democratic Party. For the IS members entering the working class, cutting the ties between most union leaders and the Democrats was a key step in reviving the unions. After all, there have been close ties between union bureaucrats and Democratic politicians since the Gompers era more than a century ago.

          Breaking with the two capitalist parties remains a crucial prerequisite to a genuinely militant working class movement, but perhaps this should be viewed as part of a process. A union that engages in militant actions to defend the interests of its members will inevitably be the target of repressive actions by an administration controlled by Democrats. These conflicts will make it obvious that the Democratic Party represents the interests of a sizable section of the ruling class and not the interests of the working class. Once this is clearly understood, independent political action will be seen as the logical outcome. Nevertheless, the point needs to be made by socialists who are active within their unions.

          A strategy that seeks to create a militant union by building an opposition caucus that can elect a new set of leaders is a strategy that is bound to fail. The focus of rank and file militants should always be on the creation of a democratic, decentralized union. The business union model has been designed to be coopted by management.

Toward A New Union Structure

          An examination of the experiences of both the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the UAW in its formative years can provide some pointers for the structural transformation of existing unions.  These proposed changes should not be taken as a rigid set of formulas, but rather a suggested direction.

          One place to start is with the union’s leadership. Full-time officials, whether elected or staff, should never earn a wage that is higher than that received by the most highly paid category of workers within that union. Big Bill Haywood was paid a weekly wage as the general secretary-treasurer of the IWW that was in line with that being earned by copper miners. The current president of the Teamsters, Sean O’Brien, receives a salary of $250,000, more than three times the pay earned by a full-time driver at UPS on a regular shift.

          Bureaucrats often argue that they need to be granted salaries similar to those being received by corporate managers. This is a telling sign of a business union. Highly paid union officials live in the same rarefied world as corporate executives. In a militant union, rank and file activists will be eager to serve as a full-time official for a time because they believe in its mission, and not because becoming a bureaucrat is viewed as an attractive career path.

          Unions need to enforce a term limit on their officials. Election for office should be held frequently, with no more than two years between elections. There should also be a strict limit on the number of years one can hold any union office. A four-year time limit would seem a good starting point. This limit needs to hold over all full-time jobs, for both elected posts and staff jobs. Thus, someone could be elected to the national executive committee for two two-year terms, but at that point that individual would have to return to the shop floor, or leave the union.

          Having union officials entrenched in office not only stifles the democratic process, it creates a climate that is resistant to new ideas and has difficulty in responding to new challenges. A continuing turnover in the union’s leadership at every level is essential for a vital, militant union.

          One of the primary methods a union bureaucracy utilizes to create a machine is by filling staff jobs as patronage. The number of staff positions as organizer and grievance officer should be sharply limited. Furthermore, the hiring of staff jobs should be decentralized. Union locals, or perhaps metropolitan councils of locals, should be hiring staff, not the national leadership. Needless to say, the composition of union officials should reflect the diversity of the membership, both in terms of gender and ethnic minorities.

          Limiting the number and compensation of full-time officials is an important way to shift power from the bureaucracy to the rank and file. Key to this process must be the development of a core of militants who can coordinate actions at the shop floor. These can be activists who do their regular jobs and then volunteer to represent their colleagues in their department to union members throughout that workplace. Ideally, a contract can be negotiated that provides for a representative from each unit within the workplace to be paid for union activity for a few hours a week.

          The experience of Dodge Main is illustrative. Located in Hamtramck, Michigan, Dodge Main was an integrated complex made up of several automobile plants. Most of Chrysler’s cars were produced at Dodge Main in its heyday. As the UAW organized these plants during the late 1930s, it created a network of shop stewards. For every twenty-five workers, there was one steward representing the interests of union members against the demands of the foreman. Once the UAW was recognized as the bargaining agent, the shop stewards were embedded in the contract. Although they were paid their regular wage to conduct union business for several hours a week, they worked their regular jobs for most of their time in the plant. Each plant at Dodge Main had a shop steward’s council that brought together all of the stewards to resolve issues that impacted the entire workforce.

          These days, most union members do not work in large, highly integrated workplaces. Nevertheless, a system of shop stewards is essential to the creation of a militant, democratic union. Perhaps there should be two delegates from each department, one for full-time workers and the other for part-time, precarious workers. Shop stewards from the entire workplace need to meet regularly to determine the union local’s overall direction. The shop steward’s council should also hold the responsibility for initiating actions concerning issues specific to that workplaces, issues such as safety and speed-up. These actions could vary from quick, short-term walkouts, slowdowns and work to rule to a full-scale strike of indefinite length.

          Shifting power from full-time national union officials to rank and file activists and shop stewards is a critical element in a program to transform a business union, but questions concerning the negotiations of contracts are important as well. Often contracts are negotiated at the national level, such as the Teamster-UPS contract and the UAW contracts with the major auto corporations. Maintaining rank and file control over these negotiations is crucial to building a genuinely democratic union.

          No contract should ever last for more than two years. Negotiations are a time when members can directly impact the union’s policies. The negotiating team should include several shop stewards and rank and file activists. They should be reporting regularly to members in their workplace on the current state of the talks. Transparency is key to democracy.

          Once a tentative agreement on a contract has been reached a significant period, at least ten days, should occur before a vote. Members need time to fully understand a complex document before voting. Furthermore, both supporters and critics of the agreement should be given ample opportunity to explain their position to the membership. The ratification process should be viewed as a time when union members can gain a greater understanding of the problems confronting the union, It should not be a time when the leadership seeks to ram a proposed contract to an affirmative vote.

Conclusions

          These are an outline of the drastic changes in structure and procedure that are required in order to transform a business union into a militant union willing to confront the corporate bosses. It is unlikely that the radical changes in structure that are required to transform a business union can be implemented within the existing organizational framework. Whether the formation of a new union is necessary or a reform movement is able to remain within the old structure is a question of lesser importance. The focus has to remain on the changes required to democratize the union by shifting power to the rank and file.

          Finally, we need to state clearly that even a militant union can only win limited gains for its members within the narrowing constraints set by the globalization of capital. Only the revolutionary transformation of the capitalist system, and the creation of a democratic socialist society, can make it possible for the working class to achieve its goals.

         

          Further Reading

 

Chester, Eric Thomas. The Wobblies in Their Heyday: The Rise and Destruction of the Industrial Workers of the World during the World War I Era. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014; paperback ed., Amherst, MA: Levellers Press.

Jefferys, Steve. Management and Managed: Fifty Years of Crisis at Chrysler. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

La Botz, Dan. “Tumultuous Teamsters of the 1970s.” In Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner and Cal Winslow, eds., Rebel Rank and File. Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2010.

Weir, Stan. Singlejack Solidarity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1973.

         

         

         

         

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